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Abstract
The (in)equality issues facing disabled people are extensive and long-enduring. The way(s) in which equality is concep-
tualised has important consequences for understandings of disability. The ambiguity of what I call dis-equality theory is
two-fold; the apparent failure of mainstream equality theorising in, firstly, embracing disability concepts at all, and sec-
ondly, in fully incorporating the logistics of disability, particularly in relation to the social construction of such. Practices of
institutional and more complex forms of discrimination are part of those deeper structures of domination and oppression
which maintain disabled people in positions of disadvantage. Everyday practices, in the ‘ordinary order of things’ (Bour-
dieu, 2000), continue to be misrecognised as natural and taken for granted. This article critically explores the complexity
of dis-equality theorising utilising a Bourdieusian lens which explicitly incorporates complex and subtle forms of discrim-
ination, and by examining the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ approach to equality. I argue
that the way forward for dis-equality theorising in today’s rights based era must be one that considers the nuances of the
‘rules of the game’ (Young, 1990) if it is to be effective in challenging the inequalities to which disabled people have long
been subject.
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1. Introduction
The (in)equality issues facing disabled people have been
extensive and long-enduring. Research across the globe
has echoed common refrains; that, in comparison to
the non-disabled population, disabled people experi-
ence significantly higher levels of poverty, unemploy-
ment, educational underachievement, lack of access to
services, inappropriate housing, and poorer health out-
comes (Groce, Kett, Lang, & Trani, 2014;World Health Or-
ganisation [WHO], 2011). They are also more likely to be
victims of crime, subject to abuse and excluded from po-
litical participation (Emerson & Roulstone, 2014; Schur,
Kruse, & Blanck, 2013). These experiences can be exacer-
bated when disabled people occupy more than one dis-
advantaged identity category (Byrne, 2012; Crock, Ernst,
& McCallum, 2014). The extent and range of inequalities
experienced by disabled people has generated increas-
ing attention in the context of austerity, neoliberal dis-
course, and, particularly in the UK, the 2015 investiga-
tion by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CommRPD) into allegations of
‘grave or systematic violations’ of disabled people’s hu-
man rights.
Yet disability and equality remain uneasy bedfellows.
The challenges disability poses for equality theorising are
the focus of this article. Whilst a range of inequalities are
evident, equality theorising in the context of disability re-
mains in its infancy. The ways in which equality has been
conceptualised, both generally, and in a disability con-
text, has been unhelpful in advancing meaningful equal-
ity for disabled people or in challenging the deeply com-
plex forms of exclusion and discrimination that they ex-
perience. Well-meaning equality concepts can in them-
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 9–17 9
selves become part of the disabling framework they pur-
port to challenge through their extensive failure to chal-
lenge taken for granted discourses.
This article argues that a more nuanced understand-
ing of the particularities of disability and equality re-
quires exploration of subtle forms of discrimination. The
limited applicability of current equality theorising to dis-
ability is problematised and the term dis-equality is in-
troduced as a means of illuminating the juxtaposition
between equality and disability. Disability Studies has a
rich and vibrant history of challenging the marginalisa-
tion of disability from academic debates, and of theoris-
ing the range of oppressive practices that disabled peo-
ple experience (Barnes, 1991; Finkelstein, 1980; Good-
ley, 2010; Shakespeare, 2013). The article builds on that
work by exploring the complexity of dis-equality theoris-
ing using a Bourdieusian lens. It also draws on the human
rights framework as explicated by the UN Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) to pro-
vide further insight into contemporary equality concepts
and questions the extent to which these are grounded in
‘safe’ or conservative equality discourse. The article con-
cludes by arguing that the way forward for dis-equality
theorising in today’s rights based era must be one that
unpacks the nuances of the ‘rules of the game’ (Young,
1990) if it is to be effective in challenging the inequal-
ities to which disabled people have long been subject.
In other words, dis-equality must challenge the largely
taken for granted and internalised ways of being and do-
ing (the ‘rules’) of the world in which we live (the ‘game’).
2. In Whose Name? The Contradictions of Equality
The tenacity and cumulative nature of inequalities have
generated a reinvigorated examination of the concept of
equality. Yet disabled people have not been routinely in-
cluded as subjects in mainstream liberal equality theoris-
ing and jurisprudence (Silvers, 1994, in disability studies
see, for example, Kittay, 2005, 2007, 2011; Kristiansen,
Vehman, & Shakespeare, 2009). Social inequality can be
understood as a relation between a majority in whose
interests the instruments and systems of a society have
developed over time, and minorities who have been
marginal to the design and operationalisation of these
for a variety of reasons. By conceptualising the non-
disabled population as the ‘majority’ group and the dis-
abled population as the ‘minority’ group in society, the
relevance of equality frameworks for disability are evi-
dent. It is this approach which underpins this discussion.
The need for dis-equality emanates from the specific ex-
periences and characteristics of disability. The linguistic
convention of dis-equality is here defined and used as a
means of illuminating and addressing the intricacies and
complexities of equality theorising in relation to disabil-
ity and vice versa; that is, the juxtaposition of disability
and equality. The separation of equality and inequality
into distinct concepts is not helpful and fails to consider
howequality itself is often socially constructed, andways
in which equality mechanisms/tools, can in themselves
become unconscious perpetrators of inequalities.
The reasons objecting to inequality are manifold.
Scanlon (1997) identifies a number of reasons behind
objections to inequality. Firstly, humanitarian concerns
seek to eliminate inequalities to assist the alleviation of
suffering or deprivation. Secondly, inequalities can rein-
force stigmatisation and feelings of inferiority and dom-
ination. Thirdly, inequalities can lead to excess and un-
acceptable forms of power. Nagel (1977) identifies two
arguments expressing the intrinsic value of equality. The
communitarian view perceives equality as good for so-
ciety as a whole, enabling feelings of solidarity. In con-
tradistinction, the individualistic view perceives equality
as a distributive principle and a way of meeting conflict-
ing needs and interests in society. The relevance to dis-
ability can be easily ascertained across these dimensions
despite its absence in mainstream equality theorising.
The question of why we should pursue equality is
insufficient. We need to consider the question of why
which equality, or more succinctly, ‘equality of what?’
(Sen, 1992) since “the answer we give to ‘equality of
what?’ will not only endorse equality in that chosen
space, but will have far-reaching consequences on the
distributional patterns in other spaces” (Sen, 1992, p. 21).
For example, to pursue equality of opportunity may lead
to inequality of economic outcome. Baker, Lynch, Cantil-
lion and Walsh (2004) have illustrated how there is no
shortage of potential answers to the type of equality we
should consider. Indeed, “it follows that far from being a
single idea, equality refers to countless ideas, which may
have very different implications and may even be incom-
patible” (Baker et al., 2004, p. 22). Yet disability has been
conspicuously absent from these primary discussions.
While space prohibits in-depth discussion of the en-
tire field of mainstream equality theorising, it is useful to
highlight some that have been the most dominant over
time. The concept of distributive justice, for example, has
been outlined by Arneson (1993):
The concern of distributive justice is to compensate
individuals for misfortune. Some people are blessed
with good luck, some are cursed with bad luck, and
it is the responsibility of society—all of us regarded
collectively—to alter the distribution of goods and
evils that arises from the jumble of lotteries that con-
stitutes human life as we know it….Distributive justice
stipulates that the lucky should transfer some or all of
their gains due to luck to the unlucky (cited in Ander-
son, 1999, pp. 289–290).
Similarly, Cohen (1989) contends that distributive jus-
tice is concerned with the distinction between ‘luck’ and
‘choice’ in relation to compensation and where any re-
sulting inequalities reflect choices made rather than indi-
vidual misfortune. The most well-known theory of distri-
bution is Rawls’ (1971) ‘difference principle’ which grants
lexical priority to the worst off, but also allows for in-
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 9–17 10
equalities of office so long as these have been attained
under ‘fair equal opportunity’. In proposing this theory,
Rawls neglects disability and subscribes to the idea of
a ‘normal’ human being. Indicative of the time in which
he was writing, this offers us an insight into the way in
which the relationship between disability and equality
has been fraught with tension. Rawls assumes that:
All citizens are fully co-operating members of society
over the course of a complete life. This means that ev-
eryone has sufficient intellectual powers to play a nor-
mal part in society, and no-one suffers from unusual
needs that are especially difficult to fulfil, for exam-
ple unusual and costly medical requirements. (Rawls,
1980, pp. 545–6)
Deviations from the ‘norm’ are understood as ‘unusual’
and ‘costly’, and equated with individual ‘suffering’.
Dworkin (1996) moves away from a Rawlsian approach
to one that proposes equality of resources. An equal dis-
tribution of resources is one that is ‘envy-free’ where
no-one ‘envies’ the resources others have. Dworkin in-
corporates compensatory mechanisms to take account
of the differences in impersonal and personal resources
whereby personal capacities are perceived to be the re-
sult of ‘bad brute luck’ (Dworkin, 1996). This approach
has been subject to much criticism on the grounds that
it focuses on the resources people hold rather than what
they are able to do with these resources or how they are
able to convert them (Anderson, 1999). Dworkin seeks
only to compensate individuals for resource deficiencies
and not on the basis of expensive or involuntary tastes.
The problem of ‘expensive’ versus ‘involuntary’ needs
is not acknowledged. This is significant since some dis-
abled people may have involuntary expensive needs and
require greater resources to achieve similar welfare lev-
els or opportunities.
The conceptualisation of distributive justice in its var-
ious forms, has incorporated and reinforced medicalised
understandings of disability. None have progressed the
case for a positive and empowering understanding of dis-
ability, focusing instead on disability as the ‘other’. The
language adopted (where disability is mentioned) em-
bed further, conceptualisations of disability that equality
theorising should seek to challenge. Cohen for example
has talked of ‘Tiny Tim’ (1989, p. 917) and ‘the needy crip-
ple’ (1993, p. 16) while Dworkin (1996) has referred to
the ‘unfortunate’. Where equality theories that empha-
sise the distribution of something, also fail, is in their in-
herent belief that the sources of inequality result from
the ‘natural’ order. This further individualises the ‘prob-
lem’ as disability is perceived to be inevitable rather than
subject to majority/minority relations whereby the cul-
tural arbitrary is presented as non-disabled and ‘healthy’.
Equality of opportunity has received increasing legit-
imacy as evidenced in legislation such as the Equality
Act 2010 in Britain and Section 75 of the Northern Ire-
land Act (1998). Its legitimation has been based on un-
derstandings or ‘myths’ of meritocracy, fair competition
and ‘possessive individualism’ (McLaughlin, 2005). Like
other forms of equality, equality of opportunity can be
interpreted in various ways. Anderson (1999) contends
that ‘luck egalitarians’ have attempted to deal with some
of their critiques by moving from equality of outcome
to equality of opportunity so that people only start off
with equal opportunity to achieve welfare or advantage.
This is evidently incompatible with equal outcome. Dif-
ferent groups may have different resources or capital,
motivations, characteristics, or use resources in different
ways. Equality of opportunity is further problematic as
it ignores “the fact that cumulative disadvantage makes
it difficult for members of out-groups to attain the pre-
requisite merit criteria” (Fredman, 2002, p. iii). Nor does
it take sufficient account of the legacies of disadvantage
and oppression faced by disabled people prior to enter-
ing the social field where equal opportunity is being ar-
ticulated. For Fredman, the equal opportunities principle
is underdeveloped and “it is crucial not just to open the
gates, but also to equip people to proceed through them”
(Fredman, 2002, p. 12). Thus, opportunities for disabled
people do not necessarily relate to substantive outcomes
or practices.
This overview and critique is intended to demon-
strate that, with few exceptions, mainstream equality
theorising has not been inclusive of disability. The dom-
inant discourse has been a type of equality that is
grounded in conceptions of an individual with perceived
‘normal’ abilities, wherein differences in ability are med-
icalised, and related barriers positioned as ‘natural’ or
glossed over. As such, dominant equality theorising has
in fact contributed to the inequalities that disabled peo-
ple experience by positioning this group outside of equal-
ity norms, relegating disability to the margins and ulti-
mately disconnecting disability from equality debates. It
is through the concept of dis-equality that this article
seeks to make these connections explicit.
3. Developing Dis-Equality through a Bourdieusian
Lens
The work of Pierre Bourdieu has much to offer dis-
equality and in helping move beyond the hitherto min-
imal consideration of disability in equality theorising.
A Bourdieusian framework can provide the supportive ar-
chitecture needed to uncover the concealed and taken
for granted aspects of majority/minority relations im-
pacting upon the lives of disabled people. Bourdieu’s
analysis of class enables his key concepts to be effectively
applied and utilised in the exploration of disability. Aside
from, for example, Riddell, Tinklin andWilson (2005), Ed-
wards and Imrie (2003), Holt (2010), and Holt, Bowlby
and Lea (2013), application of this perspective within dis-
ability studies is noticeably sparse despite the potential
for theoretical advancement.
At the core of Bourdieu’s framework are the concepts
of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’. Together these constitute
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Bourdieu’s theory of ‘practice’. This theory of practice is
central to the exploration of the dialectic between objec-
tivity and subjectivity; the individual and society (Bour-
dieu, 1977) and, ultimately, in facilitating an understand-
ing of the roots of dis-equality. According to Bourdieu,
action, or practice is not merely a mechanical response
to objective structures but is mediated by the habitus,
the field and the availability of forms of capital. The Bour-
dieusian juxtaposition of objectivity and subjectivity can
be expressed in the following way:
[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101)
Within the context of this article, the formula can be il-
lustrated more specifically:
[(habitus of disability) (capital)] + field =
= the practices of disability
The emergent practices therefore become “collectively
orchestrated without being the product of the orches-
trating action of a conductor” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72).
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ exists in the minds of actors. The
habitus of disability, as practiced by both disabled and
non-disabled people, can be understood as the product
of the internalization of the structures of the social world
(Bourdieu, 1989, p. 18) and refers to:
[S]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, struc-
tured structures predisposed to function as structur-
ing structures, that is, as principles which generate
and organize practices and representations that can
be objectively adapted to their outcomeswithout pre-
supposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express
mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain
them. (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 53)
As both structuring and structured, the habitus of dis-
ability can be transmitted by experiences, processes and
institutions, but can in itself generate thoughts and ac-
tion. While action may have the appearance of ratio-
nal behaviour, this is in effect guided by a ‘feel for the
game’. Hence, the apparent ‘rationality’ of, for exam-
ple, disabled people in ‘choosing’ between limited edu-
cational or employment options is unconsciously guided
by that ‘feel for the game’ and the associated internal-
isation of social structures. The ‘performative visions’
or imagined possibilities (Bourdieu, 2000) that emerge
are not infinite but exist within a ‘structured space of
possibilities’ (Postone, LiPuma, & Calhoun, 1993, p. 4).
These probabilities in the context of disability can be un-
derstood as being further mediated by explicit barriers
and inaccessibility.
The dispositions inculcated within the habitus leads
to the individual ‘knowing one’s place’ (Bourdieu, 1990a,
1990b, 2000), and the ‘others’ place, that is, the place of
the non-disabled majority, and which can be maintained
by processes ofmisrecognition:
The sense of one’s place is a practical sense…, a prac-
tical knowledge that does not know itself, a ‘learned
ignorance’…which, as such, may be the victim of that
particular form of misrecognition (allodoxia), consist-
ing in mistakenly recognizing oneself in a particular
form of representation and public enunciation of the
doxa. The knowledge supplied by incorporation of the
necessity of the social world, especially in the form of
the sense of limits is quite real, like the submission
which it implies and which is sometimes expressed in
the imperative statements of resignation: ‘That’s not
for us’… (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 185).
For this reason, a disabled personmay, in exploring imag-
ined possibilities of desired social roles, career prospects
or citizenship, perceive those readily available to non-
disabled people as ‘not for the likes of us’. Such per-
ceptions can be continually reinforced by outside agents
such as teachers, parents and wider cultural assump-
tions as well as institutional discourses of disability and
(in)equality. Understandings about ways of ‘being’ and
‘doing’ and related social divisions become naturalised
and enable the familiar world or cultural arbitrary to be
taken for granted. It is this naturalisation which emerges
as part of those deeper structures of domination and op-
pression and which resound further than those physical
barriers which may be initially more evident. These deep
structures can become self-perpetuating and difficult to
challenge given their apparent naturalised state. While
acknowledging that the habitus is not ‘destiny’ (Bour-
dieu, 2000, p. 180), the dispositions constituting the habi-
tus are durable and cannot be easily transformed. This
contention appears to maintain the dominated in a posi-
tion of ‘doxic submission’ with little opportunity of effec-
tively challenging their location. Yet we could argue that
disabled people, and the disabilitymovement, have been
actively challenging the inferior identity they have been
ascribed. By the same token however, progress remains
relatively slow despite ongoing challenge and it is this
which Bourdieu refers to as ‘durable’, since it takes time
for the habitus of both the disabled and non-disabled
populations to be reconstituted. Even where the domi-
nant cultural arbitrary is challenged, it will not be until
the habitus of the non-disabled population is effectively
transformed via the internalisation of ‘new’ dispositions
that we will see substantive change.
The habitus of disability is mediated by the accumu-
lation, possession and convertibility of various forms of
‘capital’. The forms of ‘capital’ to which Bourdieu refers
are resources upon which individuals and groups draw
and utilise in order to maintain or enhance their (invol-
untarily ascribed) positions in the social order. These
resources include economic, social and cultural capital.
The possession and legitimation of these forms of capi-
tal, cultural capital in particular, by the dominant or non-
disabled majority, dictates what is ‘normal’ and what is
not. The spoken competences demanded by the cultural
arbitrary, for example, makes it difficult for sign language
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users to participate across fields on an equal basis with
their non-disabled peers. This is especially relevantwhen
analysing the educational experiences of young deaf peo-
ple who are sign language users and whose linguistic
difference makes capital accumulation and conversion
problematic. Mainstream education also assumes famil-
iarity with the cultural arbitrary, in this context domi-
nated by the non-disabled majority and becomes mani-
fest in forms of teaching and assumed knowledge, being
able to access classroom situations and resources with-
out hindrance, and familiarity and usage of written and
spoken English. Non-disabled people are thus able to ef-
fectively utilise those educational opportunities which
are presented to them in contrast to the struggle experi-
enced by those who are disabled by the construction of
cultural norms. The legitimation of these norms is con-
tinuously reinforced by emphases on concepts such as
equality of opportunity and meritocracy.
As Edwards and Imrie (2003) postulate, the ‘im-
paired’ or ‘disabled’ body itself becomes a ‘bearer of
value’ or a form of physical capital, and greater value
is bestowed on the ‘body beautiful’ of the non-disabled
majority. The possession of capital then, has a symbolic
dimension which facilitates the “cognition, communica-
tion and social differentiation of power relations” (Bour-
dieu & Passeron, 1977). This form of symbolic capital, or
rather, the symbolic effects of capital, becomes an instru-
ment of recognition, and by the same token, misrecog-
nition, of relations between disabled and non-disabled
populations (see above). Thus, the non-disabled body
can become misrecognised (or mistakenly accepted as)
as superior or of greater value, and perpetuated through,
for example, the media. What is of significance here, is
not just the potentialities of capital, but their subsequent
effects. For disabled people, negative symbolic capital
becomes manifest as a form of symbolic domination. As
Bourdieu has argued, “there is no worse dispossession
perhaps…, than that of the losers in the symbolic struggle
for recognition, for access to a socially recognized social
being, in a word, to humanity” (2000, p. 241).
The habitus of disability and forms of capital interact
with the ‘field’ to produce outcomes, or practices of dis-
ability. The ‘field’ is a social microcosm constitutive of
a set of objective structures and competitive positions
in which the habitus of disability operates. This can re-
fer to the field of learning, employment, independent
living and so on. The largely invisible relations between
individuals and groups in a particular field are contin-
gent upon relations of power and capital (Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992). The field becomes a site of struggle
and conflict over the application of resources in a bid to
maintain or enhance existing positions in the social or-
der. Each field then, provides us with a relational frame
of reference through which practices, inequalities, and
ultimately, dis-equality, can be analysed. It is further il-
lustrative of the ways in which complex forms of discrim-
ination can emerge.
4. Dis-Equality and Complex Forms of Discrimination
Discourses of equality articulated by institutions and le-
gal or regulatory texts can be understood as objectifica-
tions of dominant world visions. These discourses can be
much less challenging than they might appear when we
begin to analyse them in detail. In some cases, they can
emerge as strategies of conservation or ‘safe’ equality. In
other words, legislation and policies can be framed in a
way that enables the continued legitimation of existing
practices. Legislation and policies are not value free but
contain implicit messages aboutmajority/minority social
group relations. In so doing, they become part of the rou-
tine regimes that enable complex formsof discrimination
to persist, that is, of institutional and systemic discrimina-
tion (McLaughlin, Khaoury, & Cassin, 2006). Institutional
practices routinely create inequality while systemic dis-
crimination emanates from the taken for granted ‘rules’
of everyday practice(s). These ‘rules’ are part of the
regimes of social action, or in Bourdieusian terms, part
of the ‘immanent structures of the game’. These routine
regimes then, are part of those deeper structures of dom-
ination and oppression with which dis-equality should
be concerned.
The language of complex forms of discrimination has
much to offer dis-equality. Loosely defined as ‘diffuse,
implicit and collective rather than individual’, complex
forms of discrimination can be understood as those “per-
vading patterns in social practiceswhich serve to exclude,
devalue or disadvantage individuals sharing a minority
group trait” (McLaughlin et al., 2006, p. 1). McLaughlin
et al. suggest that these practices are unlikely to be inten-
tionally discriminating given that they arise out of those
‘day-to-day norms’ and the taken for granted. It is pre-
cisely this which is highlighted by Bourdieu when he ar-
gues “the dominant class have only to let the system they
dominate take its own course in order to exercise their
domination” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 190). Thus domination,
and complex forms of discrimination, can occur below
the level of individual consciousness. Achieving equality
for disabled people in a system where the game has al-
ready begun, and where the rules and standards have al-
ready been set, is evidently contradictory since it implies
a form of equality that enables disabled people to ‘fit in’
with an already constructed society and associated social
systems, that is, a form of equality which fails to radically
challenge the root of all inequalities. To do so implies
changing a system that already works to the apparently
legitimate advantage of the majority non-disabled pop-
ulation and on the basis of institutional ‘mastery of the
game’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 230). Until there is a sense of
need for themajority population to change deeper struc-
tures of domination and oppression and to instigate this
change, complex forms of discrimination as experienced
by disabled people in our society will prevail.
Discourses of equality in a disability context remain
heavily influenced by ‘regulatory texts’ (Smith, 2005),
that is, by textual representations of equality as legisla-
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tively expressed. Such texts are significant since they
“continue to authorise and subsume local particularities
resulting from the work of translation” (Smith, 2005,
p. 199); they can set the scene for ‘safe equality’. Legis-
lation and policies such as the Disability Discrimination
Act (1995) (DDA), Equality Act (2010), and the Special
Educational Needs and Disability Act (2002) (SENDA) in
the UK can be viewed as falling into this trap. For ex-
ample, the medicalised definition of disability contained
within these frameworks ‘contradicts many of the prin-
ciples of the liberal equality framework’ (Woodhams &
Corby, 2003, p. 159). Further, the DDA allowed failure of
reasonable adjustments1 to be justified in certain circum-
stances (Lawson, 2008). Indeed, what is ‘reasonable’ de-
pends on a range of factors, including how practicable it
is for, for example, the employer tomake the adjustment,
the cost of making it, the extent of any disruption to its
business activities, the organisation’s financial resources
and how effective the adjustment would be in overcom-
ing the individual’s disadvantage To put it another way,
disabled people are immediately put at a disadvantage
given the construction of the ‘game’ (or society) by and
for a non-disabled majority. Equality instruments such
as those above have fitted in or around the status quo
rather than attempting to seriously challenge it. This can
allow for change to be encroached in ‘safe’ ways that are
favourable to the cultural arbitrary (for example, on the
grounds that change would be ‘unreasonable’ or disrup-
tive to business activities). This inadequacy is archetypi-
cal of dis-equality instruments in today’s society. The util-
ity of a Bourdieusian framework in understanding the
processes of legitimation inherent within legislative de-
velopments is central.
The UNCRPD can be understood as the most im-
portant contemporary regulatory text on dis-equality. It
builds on the growing recognition by other treaty bod-
ies such as the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (2009), of systemic, cumulative and inter-
sectional discrimination. The UNCRPD makes extensive
references to equality and non-discrimination. A defini-
tion of discrimination is set out in Article 2 while for the
first time in a human rights instrument, Article 2 defines
‘reasonable accommodation’ as:
Necessary and appropriate modification and adjust-
ments not imposing a disproportionate or undue bur-
den, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on
an equal basis with others of all human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.
Article 5 UNCRPD sets these terms in their context. Arti-
cle 5(3) obliges States Parties to take all appropriate steps
to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided in
the pursuit of equality while Article 5(4) enunciates that:
‘Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or
achieve de facto equality of personswith disabilities shall
not be considered discrimination under the terms of the
present Convention’.
All provisions of the UNCRPD must be read in light of
Article 3 (General Principles). Whilst 3(b) explicitly sets
out non-discrimination as a general principle alongside
equality between men and women (3(g)), the remain-
ing six principles constitute variants of the equality prin-
ciple, encompassing the concepts of dignity and auton-
omy (3(a)), participation and inclusion (3(c)), respect for
difference (3(d)), equality of opportunity (3(e)) and, in
applying equality to disability; accessibility (3(f)). The re-
mainder of the UNCRPD makes consistent references to
ensuring the rights of disabled people ‘on an equal basis’
to non-disabled people. Substantively, the UNCRPD con-
tains a wide range of economic, social, cultural, civil and
political rights, covering areas such as education, health-
care, home and family, accessibility, mobility, informa-
tion, political participation, and protection from inhu-
man and degrading treatment. By bringing these rights
to the fore, the UNCRPDmakes their applicability and rel-
evance to the lives of disabled people clear. The fact that
disabled people themselves were actively involved in the
negotiation and drafting of the treaty further strength-
ens the inclusivity of and responsiveness of the treaty to
disabled people’s lived experiences.
These provisions are to be undoubtedly welcomed.
They provide further recognition and insight into the
metrics of substantive equality in a disability context and
a much more rounded approach to dis-equality than has
hitherto been taken. This article argues however, that in
recognition of the long battle which preceded the UN-
CRPD’s adoption, wemust continue to be responsive and
to push the boundaries of dis-equality. The UNCRPD and
its typified rights is no doubt itself a challenge to and for
the dominant cultural arbitrary who are obliged to make
the UNCRPD rights real. However, we must also be mind-
ful of the power of theUNCRPDas a regulatory text. To as-
sume that a treaty, simply because it has been adopted,
is value-free would be naïve. To maximise the UNCRPD’s
power as a tool for change for disabled people it is impor-
tant to be aware of and engage with any barriers to the
UNCRPD’s potentialities whether implicit or explicit. The
use of well-recognised equality concepts around discrim-
ination, equality of opportunity, and ‘on an equal basis
with others’ is arguably reflective of the cultural arbitrary
on which the international human rights community is
structured and into which dis-equality is expected to
fit. In other words, these well-established equality tools
have already been developed and debated by and for
the non-disabled majority in the context of mainstream
equality theorising as highlighted in Section 2 above. We
have no guarantee that these concepts will always be in-
terpreted at State level in a way that is meaningful for
disabled people or as intended by the UNCRPD’s drafters.
Facilitating access to rights on ‘the same basis as’ non-
1 Equality legislation in the UK uses the phrase ‘reasonable adjustment’ to denote changes to practices or procedures that may be required while the
CRPD uses the term ‘reasonable accommodation.’ See next paragraph for further details.
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disabled people fails to recognise and challenge the ex-
tent to which initial rights accorded to non-disabled peo-
ple now form the taken for granted rules upon which ev-
eryday practices are based. The author is not suggesting
that some kind of new or different rights need to be es-
tablished, rather, in order to move forward in equality
and rights discourse, we need to remember where we
have come from and that being explicitly granted rights
‘on the same basis’ as non-disabled people is further in-
dicative of the way in which disabled people have en-
tered the equality and rights ‘game’ after it has already
begun andwherein the now naturalised ‘rules’ (practices
and rights) have been based on non-disabled ideals.
International human rights law plays a critical role in
legitimating new or challenging existing ‘norms’. So too
can they risk facilitating littlemore than assimilationwith
the dominant culture or espousing ‘safe’ equality if exist-
ing programmes, standards, activities, services and ways
of being and doing are presented as meritorious. Simi-
larly, as noted in Section 2, equality of opportunity as-
sumes that fair competition can exist, that the rules of
the competition are fair, and that the outcome of the
competition is also fair. What the UNCRPD does not do,
in relation to the latter concept, is specify precisely how
the competition can be made fairer in the context of
disability. Thus, assumptions of cultural familiarity risks
continuing to be maintained while inequalities of con-
dition are ignored, and the naturalisation of prescribed
standards misrecognised. Whilst indicative of the impor-
tance of substantive equality, the concept of reasonable
accommodation is also problematic. What is understood
as ‘reasonable’ by one State Party may differ from an-
other. As Mégret and Msipa (2014, p. 265) note, there
‘is a priori something inherently contentious about what
constitutes ‘reasonable’ accommodation’. Consideration
also needs to be paid to what constitutes an ‘undue bur-
den’ to the duty-bearer. Implicit within understandings
of justifiable discrimination and reasonable accommoda-
tion is the idea that disabled people and their needs are
both burdensome and expensive andwherein the notion
of reasonableness and its subjective parameters risks be-
coming something of a safety net and/or an institutional
conservation strategy against structural change.2 Con-
cepts of reasonable accommodationwhilst purporting to
offer a solution to exclusionary practices, can themselves
become a barrier to inclusion and equality by designat-
ing some disabled people, and those with more complex
needs in particular, as having needs that are ‘unreason-
able’, ‘too costly’ and ‘too burdensome’. Whilst viewed
as a key avenue through which disabling barriers can be
eradicated and of achieving substantive equality, the con-
tinuing justification for practices that are clearly discrimi-
natory, but ‘unreasonable’ to remove, once again risks lo-
cating the ‘problem’ of disability with the individual who,
but for their costly requirements perceived as resulting
from individual need, would be ‘able’ to fully participate.
While the UNCRPD is a set of international standards,
it is, to a large degree, interpreted and implemented
by State parties at national levels, at least until mean-
ing is elaborated upon by the CommRPD in its General
Comments and/or Concluding Observations. In this way,
the UNCRPD has the potential ability to emerge as the
‘friend’, not ‘foe’ of the cultural arbitrary if obligations
can be interpreted in a way that is favourable to a State
party. This resonates with Bourdieu’s argument that “law
does no more than symbolically consecrate…the struc-
ture of power relations among the groups and the classes
that is produced and guaranteed practically by the func-
tioning of these mechanisms” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 132).
This is not to say that the UNCRPD does so consciously,
but to highlight that it is not enough to espouse agreed
aims and substantive rights, Rather, the underlying as-
sumptions onwhich they can be basedmust be critiqued
and challenged where needed and the way(s) in which
they should be interpreted should be made explicit.
Some of this work is already being carried out by
the CommRPD through the medium of its General Com-
ments and Concluding Observations. Given the limited
resources of CommRPD and the time it will take through
to get through the initial reports of the 175 countries
who have ratified to date, progress will be gradual. The
CommRPD which constitutes a majority of disabled peo-
ple creates a critical strategic space for the habitus of dis-
ability to be challenged among both disabled and non-
disabled people, and for new imagined possibilities and
performative visions to emerge. As highlighted in Sec-
tion 3, it takes time for durable dispositions or mindsets
to change. The UNCRPD and its Committee has a criti-
cal role to play in facilitating this change. The composi-
tion of the Committee in particular can help create direct
ownership of the UNCRPD by the disability community
globally and provide added legitimacy to the interpreta-
tion of UNCRPD rights. This has arguably been reaffirmed
by Committeemembers’ noted celebration of the extent
of involvement by disabled people’s organisations in the
first UNCRPD examination of the UK in August 2017. Per-
haps this is a moment in history where we see some
of those durable dispositions vociferously and continu-
ously challenged. Nonetheless, we must also be mind-
ful of other issues that can emerge; while the CommRPD
constitutes a majority of disabled people, at the time of
writing, seventeen of the eighteen committee members
are male.
5. Conclusion
The intricacies of ‘equality’ across social groups are with-
out doubt, compelling. It is clear from research (WHO,
2011; Emerson & Roulstone, 2014; Schur et al., 2013)
that inequalities abound for disabled people across a
multitude of domains. The immediate barriers around ac-
cessibility, attitudes, and awareness are indicative of a
2 At the time of writing, a general comment on equality and non-discrimination is being drafted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities. A Day of General Discussion on this issue was held on 25 August 2017.
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greater symptomatic cause; that of underlying complex
forms of discrimination and the concealed power that un-
derpins majority/minority relations. Yet attempts to re-
dress these issues through equality theorising have been
scant or inadequate. Questioning existing constructions
of equality is important if we are to confront ideologi-
cal influences and challenge their effects. So too must
complex forms of discrimination be extensively identi-
fied and turned around. The aim of this article has been
to illuminate the juxtaposition of disability and equality
through a Bourdieusian lens. It does not claim to have
addressed all the issues, but rather to create space for a
more nuanced understanding of dis-equality and to fur-
ther stimulate contemporary debate about the construc-
tion of practices of disability.
The location of complex forms of discrimination
within a Bourdieusian framework facilitates exploration
and challenge of those dominant cultural norms and in-
stitutional structures which have for so long categorised
disabled people as innately different. The application of
complex forms of discrimination to dis-equality theoris-
ing ultimately enables the complexity of the relationship
between disability and equality to be explored by identi-
fying the taken for granted and immanent rules onwhich
majority/minority relations are constituted in a society
designed by and for a non-disabled majority. It thus of-
fers much potential in dissecting the nuances of social
practice as experienced by disabled people.
The UNCRPD goes some way to mediating existing
terms and conditions for disabled people. Such a rights
based approach is an example of a more measured ap-
proach to dis-equality than has hitherto been the case.
However, we must not be complacent. Many challenges
remain, and effective implementation of these legit-
imised rights is an ongoing battle. The typified UNCRPD
rights, by virtue of their inclusion, can be perceived as
the optimum solution to the marginalisation, discrimina-
tion, and inequalities that disabled people experience,
yet they risk being based on a so-called ideal cultural
arbitrary that takes non-disabled roles and bodies as its
prototypes. There is a need for debate on whose vision
of rights a rights discourse is based upon. If no previ-
ous human rights treaties existed and the UNCRPD was
the first to introduce any equality related concepts, what
would this look like? Given that the UNCRPD is based
on, and builds upon existing human rights treaties, there
is a risk that it further naturalises the existing human
rights framework, itself based initially, through the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), on a con-
ception of an able-bodied rights holder. Care must be
taken to ensure that the UNCRPD does not become en-
croached in forms of safe equality or institutional con-
servation strategies by virtue of the interpretive power
of States parties. Nevertheless, it is heartening that the
Committee appears to be taking greater cognisance of
the complex forms of discrimination that can emerge by
referring to it in its work to date through, for example,
General Comments and Concluding Observations. Irre-
spectively, open and enabling conversations need to take
place about what equality really means in the context
of disability, and the extent to which equality theorising
can be inclusive of the needs of all disabled people. We
would do well to revisit and progress the hitherto legit-
imised equality discourse to address contemporary gaps
and challenges so that equality theorising can itself be
reflective of the equality it seeks to achieve.
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